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Public participation as participatory 
conflict resolution: Shortcomings 




In South Africa the constitutional order brought about by the transition to 
democracy, and the subsequent policy and legislation frameworks, have enabled 
ordinary people to participate in governance and policy making. Yet, according 
to some studies, the importance of participation – agreed to by politicians, 
practised and promoted by academics – has yet to be translated into a lived 
reality at the local level. In this paper, I write about the debates on participation, 
its advantages, and disadvantages.
This paper offers an additional resource to public participation practitioners 
and beneficiaries, aiding them in the use of negotiation, mediation, and generic 
conflict resolution approaches to resolve public participation stalemates, and in 
the process, to strengthen and legitimise those public participation processes. 
Drawing on the existing literature, I describe what works and why; I also 
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point out the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. Ultimately, the 
objective is to share the complementary nature of conflict resolution and 
public participation, and show how – if they are combined effectively – public 
participation can be enhanced. 
While I strongly believe that the literature supports my contention that 
conflict resolution principles and practices are useful for fair and equitable 
public participation, I do not have authoritative empirical evidence to state 
this as fact. Nonetheless, I believe that the ‘best practices’ outlined in the paper 
are useful and valuable tools and should be implemented as far as possible.
Public participation in democratic local government
Public participation is particularly important in South Africa, where (before 
1994) African, Coloured and Indian communities were excluded from 
meaningfully participating in decision making within state and government 
institutions or structures. Statutory mechanisms such as the Group Areas Act 
(No. 41 of 1950)1 and the Population Registration Act (No. 41 of 1950)2 made 
it illegal for the majority of communities to engage with decision-makers 
openly and gainfully. Following the transition to democracy, culminating in 
the 1994 elections, the new Government of National Unity (GNU) embarked 
on the challenging task of addressing these injustices and forms of statutory 
exclusion by (among other methods) rebuilding the status and importance of 
local government through bringing communities closer to decision-makers. 
Local government, as the sphere of government closest and most accessible to 
1 The Group Areas Act of 1050 (Act No. 41 of 1950) was an act of parliament created under 
the apartheid government on 27 April 1950. The act assigned racial groups to different 
residential and business sections in urban areas – in effect excluding Blacks, Coloureds and 
Indians from living in the most developed areas of South Africa. 
2 The Population Registration (Act No. 41 of 1950) required that each inhabitant of South 
Africa be classified and registered in accordance with their racial characteristics. Social 
rights, political rights, educational opportunities and economic status were largely 
determined by the group to which an individual belonged. The South African parliament 
repealed the act on 17 June 1991. However, the racial categories defined in the Act remain 
ingrained in South African culture and they still form the basis of some official policies, 
aimed at correcting past economic imbalances. 
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the community, is therefore tasked with ensuring that communities and the 
general public participate actively. 
Local government in South Africa had no constitutional protection until 
the early 1990s. It was perceived as an extension of the state, and as carrying 
out the same functions as those carried out by provincial government. This 
situation was compounded by the exclusion of the majority from political 
participation until 1994. Instead, South Africa’s form of government ‘was 
highly centralised, deeply authoritarian and secretive …. The approach 
to planning in general was influenced in Britain, which stressed “efficiency 
concerns” and was dominated by scientists such as architects and engineers, 
who held the view that all planning had technical solutions…’ (Williams 2000, 
cited in Pretorius 2008:175). It was within this context that the post-apartheid 
Constitution (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996: section 
40) sought to move progressively towards the social and economic upliftment 
of local communities, and ensure universal access to essential services. 
Since 1996, the Constitution has guaranteed local government its own sphere 
of governance, so that it is no longer an extension of national or provincial 
government. To ensure a developmental approach, and people-centred, 
integrated development planning at the local level, the constitution (1996: 
section 152 (1)) states that ‘The objects of local government are ... (e) to 
encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations 
in matters of local government’. Within the framework of co-operative 
governance, the South African government has enacted an impressive basket of 
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legislation on local government that demands public participation in municipal 
decision-making, planning, budgeting and finances.3, 4, 5, 6
Particularly relevant is the requirement of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000: that municipalities have to develop a culture of public 
participation by building the capacity of local communities, councillors and 
officials to participate in municipal affairs. From the constitutional and legal 
frameworks discussed above, it is evident that the unequal de jure access to formal 
participation under apartheid no longer exists. In South Africa, participation 
in local government takes place in terms of two main objectives. The first 
relates to upholding the principles and systems of participatory democracy 
through participation in formal structures such as elections and referendums. 
The second relates to the local government development mandate to alleviate 
poverty through service delivery and localised socio-economic develop- 
ment initiatives. 
In the context of participation as a democracy through elections and 
referendums, on balance South Africa has shown stability due to largely peaceful, 
free and fair electoral processes. The state enjoys continued legitimacy thanks to 
a set of functional institutions, separation of powers between the legislature, 
the judiciary and the executive, and a fairly robust and independent media. 
3 The Municipal Structures Act (1998), section 19 (3), states that a municipal council must 
develop mechanisms for public participation in performing its functions and exercising its 
powers. Additionally, the Act stipulates that a municipality’s executive must give an annual 
report on the extent to which the public has participated in municipal affairs.
4 The Municipal Systems Act (2000), chapter 4, determines that a municipal council must 
develop a culture of participatory governance, and for this purpose must encourage and 
create conditions for residents, communities and other stakeholders in the municipality to 
participate in local affairs.
5 The Municipal Finance Management Act (2003) encourages the participation of 
communities in the finances of municipalities, including the development of municipal 
budgets.
6 The Municipal Property Rates Act (2004) stipulates that the public must participate in the 
determination of municipal property rates.
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The increased electoral turn-out during the 2011 local government elections,7 
and the continued majority support for the dominant party (the African National 
Congress, or ANC)8 and growing political support for the main opposition 
party (the Democratic Alliance, or DA)9 means there is much to be celebrated as 
far as progress towards democratic consolidation is concerned. The functioning 
institutions of democratic processes and procedures are indeed worth noting. 
However, democracy and its sustainability need more than structure, a set 
of rules and procedures. Democracy needs substance to remain relevant and 
legitimate. Davids (2005:6) perhaps sums up this challenge best: 
Democracy is not just a structure; it’s a process that depends on the ongoing 
participation of its stakeholders, the South African citizenry. There is much 
at stake in the long-term success of South African democracy, and while 
much depends on what happens at national and provincial levels, the stakes 
are equally high at the local government level.
The following questions must also be reviewed: To what extent do formal public 
participation spaces represent voices fairly and equitably when expressing 
community dissatisfaction? Moreover, how inclusive and effective are they in 
the promotion of social justice? South Africa’s public participation discourse 
draws mainly from two influences: the anti-apartheid struggle, and the new 
Constitution. The struggle against apartheid inculcated a highly participatory 
notion of citizen participation in the majority of the population. Mass democratic 
organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and many civic 
organisations established models of debate, consultation and accountability 
that carried over from the 1980s to the drafting of the new Constitution in the 
7 Independent Electoral Commission local government elections results released 22 May 
2011. The 2011 elections were the fourth local government elections in a free South Africa – 
with 57.6 per cent voter turn-out, the biggest ever since 1994. 
8 The ANC won the highest number of seats and councils: 198 councils and 5 633 seats, 
constituting 62 per cent of the vote. 
9 The main opposition party, the DA, increased its support and came second with 18 
councils; 1 555 seats and 23.9 per cent of support. The ANC has always been (and continues 
to be) the dominant force in post-1994 South African politics. The gradual growth of an 
opposition party – in this case, the DA – is good for multi-party politics and, in the long 
term, democratic consolidation. 
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Constitutional Assembly. Drawing on these principles of engaged citizenry, the 
Constitution provides a framework for public participation in all spheres of 
government – especially at the local level: the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
institutionalises community participation as a core function in all the activities 
of a municipality. 
Furthermore, it specifically gives a mandate to local councils to ‘determine 
mechanisms, processes and procedures for interaction’10 between municipal 
management, councillors, ward committees and the local community. More 
specifically, the Municipal Structures Act promulgates that members of local 
councils be allowed to join these committees.11 
However, the dominant discourse in democratic South Africa is that the legal 
framework provided for in the Constitution is nothing more than ‘hurdles that 
are inadvertently and sometimes deliberately erected … to undermine public 
participation and in effect weaken social citizenship’ (Skenjana and Kimemia 
2011:56). The assumption prevails that there is an inclusive, elected leadership 
representing only their specific constituencies in all spheres of government, 
which is in contrast to the objective of the electorate participating directly at all 
levels of decision making. The second weakness of the current practice of public 
participation is based on the false premise that all humans in South Africa have 
equal access to rights. Cases such as Grootboom vs. SA State (Wickeri 1999) exist 
in which socio-economic rights were successfully defended in a court of law. 
However, even in this case, the poor were not able to access their rights as the 
judgement had proposed. The court did not compel local authorities to provide 
quality, sustainable services to the affected communities in whose favour the 
court had ruled; also, the right to adequate service delivery was not enforced. 
South Africa’s structural articulation between the politics of participation and 
that of substantive social change is weak (vis-à-vis the constitutional right to 
equal citizenship) for two main reasons. Firstly, although unequal relations of 
power were inherited from the past, there has not been a clean and lasting break 
with those societal imbalances. The dominance of functionaries and learnt 
10 Section 56 (6).
11 Section 73.
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practices from the past (the apartheid order) still prevail. Secondly, institutional 
compliance with the policies introduced by the new democratic order is lacking. 
Those charged with promoting and facilitating participatory democracy have 
failed to cater adequately for the greater populace, or to appreciate the various 
tools, methods, skills and expertise necessary to include everyone in the 
structures and institutional arrangements that have been set up. 
Role of councillors in promoting public participation at 
the local level
The model of developmental local government adopted in 1998 was formulated 
through legislation, in the form of the Municipal Structures Act (1998) and 
the Municipal Systems Act (2000). In 2001 the number of municipal entities 
was rationalised, from 1 000 down to 284 municipalities. This was aimed at 
promoting effective local government in order to make better use of limited 
development resources. To facilitate the forms of participative democracy 
outlined in these Acts, the ward committee system was introduced. This system 
has become the main form of public participation in local government. 
The work of councillors is guided by the framework in the White Paper on 
Local Government (1998), which proposes a developmental model of local 
government. This model promotes the philosophy of using sustainable methods 
to meet the socio-economic needs of residents – particularly targeting the 
poorest and most marginalised members of society. 
There are two broad categories of councillors: ward councillors and Proportional 
Representative (PR) councillors. PR councillors are elected through their 
party lists, and are accountable primarily to their parties (South African Local 
Government Association and German Technical Cooperation 2006:54). A PR 
councillor may interact with local and provincial party structures, and may 
sometimes serve as a substitute chairperson on a ward committee if the ward 
councillor cannot be present. PR councillors are also allocated to particular 
wards in order to increase their accountability to their communities (Jossel 
2005). Ward councillors,12  on the other hand, are expected to make sure that 
12 Ward councillors are elected by a specific, geographically defined ward.
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the concerns of the wards in which they serve (as ward committee chairpersons) 
are represented in Council. Apart from representing the needs of residents in 
council, ward councillors are responsible for:
• giving ward residents progress reports explaining council decisions 
in committing resources to development projects and programmes 
affecting them,
• assessing intended impact of municipality programmes and plans,
• assessing whether services are being delivered fairly, effectively and in a 
sustainable way,
• determining whether capital projects are being rolled out in accordance 
with Integrated Development Plans (IDP),
• keeping in close contact with their constituencies to ensure that the 
council is informed of all issues on the ground, and
• conveying important information to residents from the council.
Councillors serve a key role as the interface between the citizens they represent13 
and the municipal officials who design and implement development policies. 
Councillors also act as watchdogs and ensure that the municipality implements 
policies to address the needs of citizens. The ward councillor, as chairperson of 
his or her ward, must also raise concerns to council on behalf of ward members 
when residents experience problems relating to the financial management of a 
council.14 
Ward committee system weaknesses and community 
dissatisfaction
A number of studies have highlighted key weaknesses and challenges facing public 
representatives. These include high councillor turnover (Atkinson 2002), poor 
decision-making and communication structures in municipalities, and ineffective 
councillors (Atkinson 2002; Sebugwawo 2011; Karamoko 2011; Hirsh 2010). 
13 See, for case studies on the Port Elizabeth municipality and Motherwell in the Nelson 
Mandela municipality, Masango 2011 and Shaidi 2010, respectively.
14 See Municipal Finance Management Act, Section 17 (f). 
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Councillors serve as members of Council committees and are usually charged 
with the development of new policies. Committees include the Executive 
Committee, which decides what policies and proposals are put before Council 
to be discussed and (where possible) enacted as municipal policy.15 Section 33 of 
the Municipal Structures Act (2000) provides that a municipality may establish 
committees, detailing the specific powers of such committees and the need 
for delegation and commitment of resources to such committees. Section 79 
committees are established by Council and its members for the efficient and 
effective performance of Council. The Executive Mayor may appoint a person 
from the Mayoral Committee or Executive Committee to chair a Section 
79 committee, and may also delegate powers and duties to the committee if 
necessary. Section 80 committees are also established by Council, specifically 
to support the mayor. To promote inclusive, participatory governance, 
municipalities are encouraged to use the committee system, with preference 
given to Section 79 committees (Community Law Centre, University of the 
Western Cape 2009:12–14). However, municipalities are not obliged to establish 
Section 79 committees, and in fact the general trend is rather to establish 
Section 80 committees (De Visser et al. 2009). These authors state that where 
Section 79 committees do exist, the trend (in larger municipal entities) is to 
relegate them to a management function covering more generic areas, rather 
than those which deal specifically with oversight (De Visser et al. 2009:25). 
This renders Section 79 committees ‘toothless’ in respect of the effective 
oversight role they should be playing through the portfolio committees.16 
By restricting portfolio committees to Section 80 committees, ordinary 
councillors are excluded from discussions on plans and policies to be 
implemented:
The deliberations and recommendations of Section 80 committee meetings 
are conveyed to the executive through a member of the executive in a meeting 
that may well be behind closed doors. This also means that councillors 
who have a seat in Section 80 committees have no knowledge of how the 
15 This is in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act, Section 17 (f).
16 Portfolio committees are responsible for oversight in specific sectors such as water, 
sanitation, roads and parks. 
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recommendation of the latter was delivered to the mayoral committees. 
In a municipality that is dominated by Section 80 committees, the room for 
an ordinary councillor to exercise oversight is therefore limited (De Visser 
et al. 2009:25). 
Despite these weaknesses, councillors are still expected to make important 
decisions by voting in Council on issues such as Council resolutions, policy 
changes, the IDP and annual budget. Moreover, many councillors, especially 
opposition councillors, are excluded from key discussions that reveal the 
content of policies and plans. Once decisions have been taken in a party 
caucus, party members are expected to vote in Council according to that 
decision. This is usually the responsibility of the PR councillors (South African 
Local Government Association and German Technical Cooperation 2006:50, 
note 91).
Municipalities are accountable to their citizens. The code of conduct 
incorporated in the Municipal Systems Act (2000:106–110) is meant to 
ensure that councillors and Council abide by the principle of accountable 
government. Councillors are also prohibited from interfering with municipal 
administration, and may not enforce an obligation in terms of the Systems Act 
(Municipal Systems Act 2002). The code of conduct is enforced through the 
intervention of a number of parties, including the Speaker, the Council and 
the Member of the Executive Committee for local government. 
Despite the provisions in the Structures and Systems Acts, De Visser (2006) 
notes that there may be weaknesses in the process for deciding which 
body investigates councillor misconduct, as well as for deciding to whom 
councillors are actually accountable with respect to the code. These issues 
become important when there is a need to ensure rapid action following a 
contravention of the code by a councillor. Since councillors are the first point 
of contact with citizens, this uncertainty about who should enforce the code 
may fuel anger among citizens, especially when they already feel that the 
municipality is not addressing their needs adequately (De Visser 2006).
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Marginalised voices in the Integrated Development 
Planning (IDP) systems
The Municipal Structures Act requires the formation of the ward committees 
to reflect the diversity of local interests, as well as gender equity.17 The local 
government policy framework requires processes, mechanisms and procedures 
for public participation that take into consideration the special needs of the 
disadvantaged groups in society. The major weakness with this arrangement 
is that it fails to recognise marginalised communities who, because of political 
vulnerability and socio-economic deprivation, are not able to participate 
meaningfully in such structures. Moreover, ‘Political affiliation and the desire 
to maintain control over ward committees take precedence over concerns of fair 
representation and the pursuit of the set developmental objectives’ (Skenjana 
and Kimemia 2011:58). In rural communities, the weaknesses found in the ward 
committees are reflected in their inability to attract diverse, strong and effective 
committees. This failure to achieve equity in representing all social formations 
and interests has resulted in a sizable ‘voice’ not being heard, and the interests of 
a sizeable population not prioritised at the local level. 
The introduction of the IDP systems in 2001 required municipal councils to 
develop strategies for community involvement, including: communication 
strategies, community outreach programmes and stakeholder involvement 
strategies (Skenjana and Kimemia 2011:59). These strategies were meant to 
improve the levels and quality of public participation; however, critics argue that 
‘the IDP processes are still far from achieving full community involvement in 
policy making as stipulated in the legislation – they remain very much top-down 
and communities are merely allowed to comment on proposals developed by 
municipal officials rather than being invited to contribute to the content before 
its drafting’ (Friedman et al. 2003:56).
The same study also found that ward meetings are dominated by questions 
about unrealised promises, and lists of demands the municipality is expected to 
address (Friedman et al. 2003:56). This is seen most often in the poorer areas of 
municipalities, where challenges are huge. Besides practical challenges, there are 
17 Municipal Structures Act 1998, section 72a (i)–(ii).
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related constraints of a logistical nature. For example, a lack of transport, a lack of 
technical and specialised skills to provide legal interpretation of documents and 
policy, and a lack of language skills and capacity to compile written submissions 
are raised as some of the inherent weaknesses hampering public participation in 
ward committees (Friedman et al. 2003:56). 
As noted above, the challenges are more severe in poorer communities, 
where ward committees display low levels of education and overall expertise. 
Additionally, there are power imbalances that make it impossible to have 
meaningful participation from the public with knowledgeable municipal 
officials. This imbalance and resultant exclusion and alienation are extended to 
the broader community and undermine the objectives of public participation: 
equity and equality. 
Getting to grips with reality at ground level
In the National Ward Committee Survey (Idasa et al. 2005:17), the percentages 
of municipal respondents who reported that their municipality had formulated 
municipal policy to structure the roles and functions of ward committees ranged 
from highs of 100 per cent in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, to lows of 41 per 
cent and 50 per cent in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, respectively. 
The study reported that documents meant to guide the roles and functions of 
ward committees were very often contained in Council guideline documents, 
but that policy documents at the municipal level were frequently only copies 
of Department Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and South African 
Local Government Association (SALGA) guidelines (Idasa et al. 2005:17). 
This suggests that despite the importance of Ward Committees in facilitating 
participatory democracy, a lack of guidelines limits the effectiveness of the 
structure. The Afrobarometer18 Round 4 Survey (Ndetlanya et al. 2008) exposes 
key weaknesses in the current performance of local councillors nationally. 
When respondents were asked how often they had been contacted by a range 
of public representatives during that year, more than two-thirds (72 per cent) 
18 The Afrobarometer is a research project that measures public attitudes on economic, 
political and social matters in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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reported they had never been contacted, and a further 10 per cent reported 
being contacted only once by their local councillor. A quality of life survey 
in low-income areas in the City of Johannesburg found low levels of contact 
between residents and local officials (Richards et al. 2006). Fewer than half of 
the residents surveyed in Joubert Park, Zandspruit and Diepsloot reported 
attending ward councillor meetings; not even a third reported knowing their 
councillor’s name, and fewer than a quarter of respondents reported being able 
to contact local government officials if they needed to. Respondents were more 
likely to contact friends and family (51 per cent) than their ward councillor or 
the local municipality (12 per cent) if they needed to resolve a problem in their 
residential area. 
Community dissatisfaction has become a more common occurrence in South 
African townships (Hough 2009). While incidents are often referred to as ‘service 
delivery protests’, a report commissioned by Parliament (2009:VI) found that:
… The term [service delivery protest] is a misnomer since, while 
dissatisfaction with poor service delivery has certainly been a factor in 
triggering some of the protest, the causes of the protest are far more varied 
and complex than this. It must therefore be acknowledged that there are a 
multiplicity of factors at the root of the current protest and that these can 
be placed into three broad categories: systemic (such as maladministration, 
fraud, nepotism and corruption in housing lists); structural (such as 
healthcare, unemployment, and land issues); and governance (such as weak 
leadership and the erosion of public confidence in leadership).
Interviews conducted by researchers support this statement (Görgens and Van 
Donk 2011, cited in Good Governance Learning Network 2011). In addition, 
researchers found ‘A growing awareness amongst individuals and communities 
about their rights, disappointment with the limited participatory potential 
of current mechanisms, a lack of reaction by officials and politicians to less 
violent protest and the growth of [relative deprivation] within and amongst 




Other researchers have found state-created public participation spaces insufficient, 
and at times ‘ill-suited to facilitate meaningful community engagement in local 
planning, decision making, resource allocation, implementation and evaluation’ 
(Friedman 2011:3). Pithouse (2009) summarises this dissatisfaction with current 
efforts to promote public participation, arguing that ‘There is a considerable 
extent to which the technocratic agenda, with its inability to enable genuinely 
popular participation in planning and its inability to confront elite interests with 
popular counter power, is inherently undemocratic’ (Pithouse 2009:8).
In an in-depth analysis of 14 community protests from 2007 onwards, Booysen 
(2009) highlights the poor performance of public representation and the 
disfunctionality of local government administrative structures as being the 
main focal points of the anger directing community protests. Booysen claims 
there is a sense of desperation over the lack of ‘connection’ to local councillors; 
and surmises that because public officials do not listen to the people, many 
community protests were caused during this period. According to Municipal 
IQ,19 ‘the incidence of municipal [community] protests rose from 27 in 2008 
to a high of 104 in 2009 (Municipal IQ Briefing 2009, cited in Paradza et al. 
2010:19). 
Trends in community protests
According to monthly briefings from the South African Local Government 
Briefings Report20  and the South African Media News Database, South Africa 
experienced an average of 8.73 protests per month in 2007, and 9.83 protests per 
month in 2008. In 2009, the average number of protests increased significantly, 
to 17.75 per month. Since mid-2009 – despite the reduced frequency of 
community protests – an increasing proportion of protests have resulted in 
violence: 53 per cent of protests taking place during or after April 2009 were 
violent. This figure dropped slightly in the 3rd quarter of 2009 (50.65 per cent), 
then increased in the 4th quarter (52.38 per cent) and the 1st quarter of 2010 
19 Municipal IQ is an organisation that monitors the socio-economic performance of South 
African municipalities.
20 The SA Local Government Research Centre publishes the South African Local Government 
Briefing monthly.
129
Public participation as participatory conflict resolution
(64.06 per cent) (Karamoko 2011; Hirsh 2010). With the advent of the FIFA 
Soccer World Cup in June 2010, the average number of community protests 
fell dramatically and remained comparatively low, with only 6.14 protests per 
month for the remainder of the year.21 Numbers remained low during the first 
five months of 2011, with an average of only 8.80 protests per month. According 
to this research, ‘Protesters cite the lack of accountability of government officials, 
along with the absence of public participation as factors that further aggravate 
their service delivery complaints’ (Karamoko 2011; Hirsh 2010). Figure 1 depicts 
the increased frequency of community protests from 2007, with 2009 showing 
almost double the figures from the previous year, and 2010 to 2011 showing a 
decrease in protests. The studies by Karamoko and Hirsh indicate that despite the 
reduction in the number of community protests since June 2010, the proportion 
of protests that have turned violent increased (Karamoko 2011; Hirsh 2010).
Source: Karamoko 2011.22 
21 The report attributes the low number of protests occurring during the month of June 
2010 to the FIFA World Cup. Holiday periods often feature lower levels of protests than 
normal. However, this does not explain why protesters missed the motivating factor of 
attracting attention to their grievances during the FIFA World Cup. Moreover, the trend 
is for protests to be more frequent during the winter months (June, July, August) and 
less frequent during the summer months (December, January, February). The 2010 FIFA 
World Cup was held in winter.
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Figure1: Average Number of Protests per Month, 2007–2011
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These figures demonstrate increased community frustration and are cause for 
concern. Protesters are excluding created and legislated platforms for dialogue 
and participation, opting instead to voice their frustrations through acts 
of intimidation and violence. It can be said that community protests are a 
symptom of a deeper problem. 
The relationships between communities and local government officials need 
to be strengthened, to address those particular shortcomings found in current 
public participation set structures. As a state response to community protests, 
the values, ethos, principles and practices of conflict resolution would be a 
good option for addressing community concerns, as they do not incentivise 
violence. As long as communities believe they can draw the attention of 
leaders to their grievances through acts of violence, these protests will remain 
a common phenomenon. Improving the effectiveness of dialogue with 
communities with respect to development issues, and promoting win-win 
situations with the involvement of communities as equals can assist in easing 
the alienation protesters often feel towards local authorities – eroding the belief 
that violence and civil disobedience are the only possible outlets for effective 
public participation. Moreover, constructive and creative alternatives can 
reduce the perception that government officials are uncaring, uncooperative 
and display exclusionary practices. 
Consensual approaches as a considered model for 
strengthening public participation 
This section deals with the effectiveness and potential value of conflict 
resolution practices in facilitating more acceptable and equitable public 
participation at local levels. For the purposes of this article, ‘best practices’ for 
conflict resolution will mean a hierarchy of principles, approaches, processes 
and tools, which have been proven effective in a variety of circumstances, 
situations and contexts. Generally, best practices for conflict resolution will 
be understood using the following framework: principles (why best practices 
should be used); approaches (strategies that achieve principles); process steps 
(for developing high quality and meaningful processes); and, tools and skills 
(for implementing each of the steps). This does not provide a blueprint; rather, 
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it is a set of principles to guide the process, and includes approaches and tools 
to use as needed. 
The participatory approach used against apartheid and the internal peace 
initiatives adopted during the talks for a democratic South Africa fostered the 
emergence of a community network that wants (and sometimes demands) 
participation. This is very significant in a national context marked by an 
incomplete consolidation of democracy and the persistence of socio-economic 
challenges, coupled with institutions that have not lived up to expectations. 
Consider, for example, this statement by Laurie Nathan (2007:2):
South Africa’s transition to democracy, widely regarded as a success, 
highlights the significance of local ownership. To a large extent the success 
was due to the process that was followed. The process was inclusive 
horizontally in the sense that all political parties were invited and urged 
to participate in the negotiations. The process was also inclusive vertically 
as numerous civil society bodies engaged in debate on all aspects of the 
settlement. Most importantly, the process was driven by local actors 
without dictates from external actors. In every sector, policies and models 
were designed by South Africans and not imposed on them by outsiders. 
As a result, the system of governance enjoys substantial legitimacy and this 
has contributed greatly to political stability.
The negotiated settlement was thus consensual, following a principle relevant to 
public participation. However, public participation practice ought to go beyond 
the customary rhetoric about local ownership, and must consider in detail how 
public participation can and should be applied by officials and other agencies. 
This process must empower participants and beneficiaries by offering analytical 
and diagnostic tools as a form of conflict resolution that can overcome some of 
the limitations in public participation as currently experienced. 
Public policy formulation is frequently contested. It attracts both support and 
opposition. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987:8–9) capture this tension as follows: 
‘The [laws] of public policymaking tend to parallel the laws of physics: for 
every imposed action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Thus, the act of 
imposing a decision can trigger a more heated and protracted dispute than the 
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content of the decision originally merited’. The shortcomings of compromise, 
which require parties to make concessions on stated needs and wants, are 
frequently off-putting for adversaries. This often results in a stalemate, with the 
matter in dispute going to court. The role of the courts is not to reconcile parties; 
neither is it to satisfy the needs and interests of either party. Often (if not always) 
the application of the law will favour one side. The losing party is left aggrieved 
and bitter. 
In democracies such as South Africa, the assumption is that elected officials are 
the  custodians of policy-making. However, what often happens is that ‘many 
important public policy issues cross political boundaries ... an electoral victory 
for a given candidate is hard to interpret as a statement of the public’s will on 
a specific controversy’(Susskind and Cruikshank 1987:9). It is for these reasons 
that alternative approaches to resolving public disputes become relevant. 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987:11) describe alternative tools for achievi ng 
consensus as follows:
Consensus building requires informal, face-to-face interaction among 
specially chosen representatives of all [stakeholding] groups; a voluntary 
effort to seek [all-gain] rather than [win-lose] solutions or watered-down 
political compromise; and often, the assistance of a neutral facilitator or 
mediator. Such approaches must be treated as supplements – and not 
alternatives – to conventional decision making. Officials with statutory 
power must retain their authority in order to ensure accountability.
Moreover, to strengthen and legitimise public participation practitioners and 
beneficiaries, conflict resolution approaches must be applied to resolve public 
stalemates. Ultimately, the objective is to display the complementary nature of 
conflict resolution and public participation, and show how they are mutually 
reinforcing. The four types of conflict resolution action of Bercovitch et al. 
(2009) must be applied to public participation: prevention, management, 
resolution, and transformation. Some will act to remove or decide the conflict, 
while others will merely work to keep it at a manageable, political level. However, 
all of these necessitate a form of conflict mapping. 
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In the words of Paul Wehr, ‘conflict mapping is a first step in intervening to 
manage a particular conflict. It gives both the intervener and the conflict parties 
a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities 
for resolution of the conflict’ (Wehr 1979:18, cited in Ramsbotham et al. 
2005:74–75). Conflict mapping is a useful analytical tool for examining disputes 
and uncovering the root cause of conflict behaviour. By examining a conflict 
and evaluating it according to the five categories – relationship, data, interest, 
structure and value – we can begin to determine what caused the dispute, identify 
the primary sector, and assess whether the cause is a genuine incompatibility 
of interests, or merely differences of perception between the parties involved. 
These insights may assist us in designing a resolution strategy that will have a 
higher probability of success than an approach which is exclusively trial-and-
error (Moore 2003:64). 
The need for public participation as conflict 
transformation 
How can we assess each specific situation to determine the most relevant and 
potentially effective approach in which public participation could be oriented 
towards using one or more of the methods of conflict resolution (as outlined by 
Bercovitch et al. 2009)? How can we determine what are the circumstances under 
which they work as ‘universal’ or ‘uniform’ practices of public participation? 
The theory of conflict prevention may be pursued as policy and (where 
possible) embedded in the practice of public participation – without necessarily 
discouraging expressions of discontent from the public. 
Conflict prevention refers to efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence. Ideally, 
conflict prevention should focus not only on containing a potentially violent 
situation, but also addressing the fundamental causes of conflict. According 
to Ramsbotham et al. (2005), conflict prevention goes further than problem 
solving in that it is proactive in preventing violence by bringing parties together 
to analyse and transform a dispute: ‘The effort to resolve conflict at an early 
stage is at the heart of prevention. It involves identifying the key issues, clearing 
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mistrust and misperceptions and exploring feasible outcomes that bridge the 
opposing positions of the parties’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2005:125). 
Conflict prevention is still a relatively marginal concern, and very few agents 
and agencies focus on it. According to Lund (2009), one reason is that there 
is a lack of agreement and uniformity about stages and types of prevention. 
He proposes that conflict prevention can be strengthened and made relevant by 
(a) having a structured framework that pulls together preventive measures and 
instruments available, and providing guidelines about approaches which are 
likely to be most feasible and productive in various conditions; (b) developing 
multi-faceted strategies that link such processes to existing country-specific 
development planning procedures, for diplomatic and military agencies as 
well as inside stakeholders; and finally (c) providing support and incentives 
to governments to encourage compliance with international norms for 
strengthening equitable state service-provision, and preventive deployment. 
Conflict management is described by Gartner and Melin (2009:564–565) as 
‘meaning any steps taken to help resolve a conflict peacefully, from bilateral 
negotiations to third-party mediation’. It has been widely used in business 
and organisational settings, to describe processes and efforts to manage the 
negative implications and manifestations of conflict. The problem with the 
concept is the implication that only the symptoms of conflict are being dealt 
with; that the conflict and its effects are contained, without due attention 
being paid to the causes. Some scholars bemoan the limitations of conflict 
management, arguing that it represents only a short ceasefire, failing to allow 
peace to consolidate so that a political settlement can take root. As Gartner and 
Melin note: ‘many management efforts result in ceasefires that last only a few 
hours and do not enable true resolution. In the recent Yugoslavian case, there 
were 91 mediated settlements, almost half of which lasted one week or less’ 
(Gartner and Melin 2009:566). On the other hand, preventing the judgement 
as to how long peace agreements last after they are agreed upon – rather than 
focusing solely on whether an agreement was reached – excludes the goal of 
the effort, which is especially problematic. In certain instances, the goal of 
conflict management might be to bring regional stability, to satisfy economic 
or military interests, to promote an ideology or to uphold human rights. It is 
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therefore necessary to separate the goals of conflict management as a strategy 
(sometimes an interim one) from the ideal of addressing the underlying causes 
of conflict.
Conflict resolution may include responding to current grievances, needs and 
conditions, as well as learning from participants to attach new values to the 
practice of public participation. However, resolution implies that conflict can 
be resolved, meaning that it is possible to find solutions to conflict in ways that 
will resolve all tension. However, conflict resolution is limited. Though it aims 
to address the causes of conflict, conflict resolution does not necessarily change 
the relationship amongst the parties enjoined in conflict, nor the systems that 
are in place, and therefore is not addressing the factors underlying the conflict. 
Conflict management has its own constraints in mostly referring to settlement 
or containment of conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). 
In contrast, conflict transformation has become popular because, as the name 
suggests, the goal is not only to end or prevent. ‘It asserts the belief that conflict 
can be a catalyst for deep-rooted, enduring, positive change in individuals, 
relationships, and the structures of the human community’ (Kraybill et al. 
2005:5). Conflict transformation therefore refers to a process that seeks to 
change the entire context of conflict. It is a process that denotes changing or 
transforming the actors, the issues, the rules, the relationships, the perceptions, 
the communications, and the structural causes of conflict in non-violent ways. 
The essence of conflict transformation can be summarised as follows:
Changing communication, [analysing the conflict] (sometimes 
contrasted but paired with problem solving), changing stereotypes and 
enemy images, changing options available and developing new ideas for 
solutions, changing one’s perceptions of change, both in the other and in 
the relationship, connecting the individual with his or her system and yet 
internalising change, and finally, transforming the inter-group/intersocial 
relationship (Pearson d’Estree, cited in Bercovitch et al. 2009:151). 
Compared with other processes, conflict transformation is most closely 
aligned with the South African context. Diana Gordon (2006:2) captures this 
precisely by arguing that transformation is the preferred and overarching word 
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that South Africans use for what is needed to make their country the vibrant, 
non-racial democracy they yearn for: 
Interpreted narrowly, transformation is merely the shifting of political and 
economic power from the white minority to the black majority. Frustrated 
whites often complain that [transformation] is merely affirmative action, 
which is in turn a justification for substituting unqualified blacks for 
competent whites in jobs, legislative bodies, or university classrooms. 
And blacks – police, teachers, journalists – argue that because racial 
representation in their occupations still doesn’t reflect the demographics of 
the society, transformation is lagging. But the broader and deeper meaning 
of transformation emerges in the constitutional context – not that the 
word is part of the text but that it embodies the spirit of that document’s 
provisions for rights and powers, especially as they elevate the protection of 
dignity and equality. 
Like the public participation model, conflict transformation assumes that all 
problem-solving processes involve moving through a systematic, constructive 
thinking process to reach a desired goal state. In the case of South Africa, where 
there are often differing and sometimes opposing views and expectations, it is 
assumed that the desired state will come from putting together those who have 
divergent views, experiences and expertise. In fact, public participation in a 
conflict context assumes that all parties must participate, because the nature of 
the conflict comes from parties that are interdependent and intertwined. 
Two other public participation assumptions are made when considering the 
problem-solving approaches used in the conflict context. First, because the 
sources of intergroup conflict are linked to unmet human needs, addressing 
these human needs (such as identity and security) must be the focus of the 
problem solving. Second, because public participation is dynamic and evolves, 
these assumptions will drive choices that lead to a certain standardisation of 
format, participants, agenda, and process. 
Yet, the core of the model remains basically the same: inclusivity and the ability 
to listen to all sides with an emphasis on fair, open and transparent process. 
In the end the value of such processes should be to serve, primarily, not the 
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interests of the powerful, but rather the interests of those who Edward Said 
(1994:113) describe as ‘the poor, the disadvantaged, the unrepresented, the 
voiceless, the powerless’. 
 Conclusion
Given the current limitations of public participation, consensual approaches 
offer the most comprehensive and coherent ways for people to express differences 
and discontent. There is significant overlap between public participation and 
the principles of (and tools for conducting) conflict resolution – especially if 
conducted as a form of conflict transformation. Extensive use of consensual 
approaches for involving the public would help in promoting working structures 
that will restore public confidence in government – especially at the local level.     
A society like South Africa’s – with a history of violence, but also a peaceful 
transition to democracy – would do well to enhance its legislated public 
participation processes with a conflict resolution system that is transformative 
in nature. Such a system, if applied in a considered manner, has (imbedded 
in its practice) psychological and cultural expectations, rules and regulations, 
processes and administrative and governance structures that go beyond the 
facilitation of dialogue and peace. This system would address basic human 
needs, which, if not satisfied often undermine effective and equitable public 
participation. 
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